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Abstract 
 
The deepest financial crisis to strike the global economy since the Great Depression 
has unceremoniously called into question the very foundations of the Western 
economic model. The liberalisation of capital flows and the growing internationali-
sation of financial markets outpaced global regulatory and supervisory efforts. The 
repercussions of the financial crisis have  given new dynamism to the reform of 
financial regulation both globally and within the European Union (EU). The Eurozone, 
by way of its own failings, has emerged as a stronger conceptual and legitimate 
entity since the onset of the crisis, but to what extent does this equate to a greater 
external role, in particular in the reform of international financial regulation?  This 
paper argues that the Eurozone is currently not in a position to play an important role 
in the reform of international financial regulation, as it is a weak actor in the context 
of the EU financial architecture, which  is still largely characterised by differing 
national regimes, a prevailing  influence from the UK  and fragmented external 
representation. The key finding from this study is that internal tensions in the EU are at 
the very heart of the Eurozone’s difficulties  in playing a role in the reform of 
international financial regulation. Surmounting these tensions is a pre-requisite for the 
Eurozone if it is to overcome its structural weakness in international financial politics. 
However, the implications of such evolutions to the Eurozone, as an entity, and to 
European integration are far-reaching.  
 
 David Smith 
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Introduction 
“Great empires rarely succumb to outside attack. But they 
often crumble under the weight of internal dissent.”1 
 
In its first ten years of existence the Eurozone was hailed as a success, the Euro had 
become the world’s  second reserve currency,  and never before had such an 
experiment been attempted. The apparent success of the Euro and the Eurozone 
appears somewhat naïve in light of the serious flaws that the banking crisis and the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis have exposed. “The Eurozone crisis is much more 
than a sovereign debt crisis. It calls into question the whole architecture of economic 
policy, from monetary policy to macroeconomic surveillance.” 2 Reforms to the 
regulatory and supervisory framework have, in spite of differences, been pursued in 
order to ensure the future stability of the financial system in Europe. Concurrently 
financial regulation on a global scale is also undergoing a phase of evolution.  
This piece of work does not intend to analyse the specific reforms proposed to 
international financial regulation or to  the  international financial architecture. 
Instead,  the objective of this paper  is to gain a greater understanding of the 
consequences that internal governance reforms could have on the external voice of 
the Eurozone  in light of the financial crisis. It will be argued that  despite the 
emergence of the Eurozone as a stronger conceptual entity in the eyes of markets 
and global partners, it is currently unable to assume a strong external role for two 
crucial reasons. Firstly, it is a weak actor in the context of the financial architecture 
within the EU due to institutional inconsistencies and the dominance of the UK and 
the City in EU financial regulation and, secondly, it suffers from a very fragmented 
system of external representation.  
It is important first to clarify the definition of financial regulation. The ‘de Larosière 
Group’ defines regulation as “the set of rules and standards that govern financial 
institutions”.3 This  paper  favours a more ‘old-fashioned’  understanding of financial 
regulation, “understood as a cluster of interrelated policies designed to ensure the 
proper functioning and integrity of financial systems”, including public regulation, 
supervision of banks,  leverage and liquidity issues, risk management and crisis 
                                                 
1 D. Gros, “The decline and fall of the euro?”, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
Brussels, 2012, retrieved 29 March 2012, http://www.ceps.be/book/decline-and-fall-euro. 
2 “Eurozone Crisis: Debts, Institutions and Growth”, CEPII, Paris, 2010, retrieved 30 April 2012, 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/publications/lettre/pdf/2010/let300ang.pdf.  
3 European Commission, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: De Larosière 
Report, Final Report, Brussels, 25 February 2009, p. 13. David Smith 
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management.4 This wider definition of financial regulation allows a richer study of the 
efforts undertaken to reform it on the international level.  
The nature of the research subject and the fact that the financial architecture in the 
EU and Eurozone are constantly evolving places limits on the scope of the analysis. 
The paper does not take into account the developments from the recent European 
Council meetings of June 2012, which suggest the European Central Bank (ECB) will 
become the supervisory body of the Eurozone.5 This paper will instead focus on the 
reforms that have already taken place in the EU, the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS), and  the proposed reforms of the UK, after  which  the external 
dimension will be analysed, specifically the interaction  of the Eurozone with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the sovereign debt crisis. 
The Eurozone, Regulation, Supervision and Crisis Management 
Before examining the recent reforms and their impact on the Eurozone’s ability to 
play a role in the reform of international financial regulation, it is  important  to 
understand the origins of the problems that the Eurozone is facing. Two factors 
appear to be important in light of the current crisis: the division between economic 
and monetary policy in the  Eurozone and the pursuit of capital movement 
liberalisation.  
Firstly, in the institutional setup of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)  a 
“divorced economic logic is fully adopted”, meaning that “according to traditional 
monetary theory, from an institutional point of view, monetary policy can be 
divorced from economic  policy”.6 Monetary policy was therefore centralised and 
the economic policy remained the domain of national governments albeit with 
some coordination at the Council of Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). The 
institutional setup of the EMU, as described in the TEU, clearly stated in article 105(5) 
that “the ESCB [European System of Central Banks] shall contribute to the smooth 
conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the Financial system” [emphasis 
                                                 
4 N. Véron, “Financial Reform after the crisis: An Early Assessment”, Bruegel, Brussels, 2012, p. 2, 
retrieved 27 April 2012, http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/ 
680-financial-reform-after-the-crisis-an-early-assessment/. 
5 S. Evans, “EU Summit: Was Merkel the winner after all?”, BBC News Online,  2 July 2012, 
retrieved 30 July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18673218.  
6 G. Caravelis, European Monetary Union, Avebury, Ashgate, 1994, p. 17. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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added].7 Therefore, prudential supervision, and implicitly systemic risk, is not treated 
by the TEU due to this divorced economic logic between monetary and economic 
policy. 
Secondly, the “complete liberalisation of capital transactions and full integration of 
banking and other financial markets” was inherent in the definition of monetary 
union supplied by Jacques Delors.8 The initial definition of monetary union envisaged 
a complete liberalisation in financial markets. Lest it not be forgotten that “the sine 
qua non  of  monetary union for Germany would be full capital movements”.9 This 
logic of liberalisation continues to be seen in the EU financial market, for example the 
European  passport for banking created by the Second  Banking Directive 
(89/646/EEC). It allowed banks to provide cross-border services more easily, but also 
created an inherent conflict of interest between the home country, which could 
supervise a pan-European financial institution, and the host country’s responsibility for 
financial stability. 
“Since 2000 the single financial market has been characterized by a ‘new’ degree of 
consensus over opening and integrating financial markets”, which was made 
apparent by the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and the ‘Lamfalussy Process’, 
both of which emerged from the Lisbon European Council of 2000.10 The ‘Lamfalussy 
Process’ explicitly advocated the benefits of more open, transparent and liberalised 
financial markets. It can, therefore, be seen as a continuation of the philosophy of 
financial market liberalisation that had prevailed in the EU since the introduction of 
capital movement liberalisation.  
Despite this, the ‘Lamfalussy Process’ did try to create the framework for the national 
supervisors and financial authorities to interact closely with each other.11 At level 3 of 
the Four-Level Approach12 proposed by the ‘Lamfalussy Process’  (see Annex  for 
more detail), each of the Committees is made up of high-level representatives of 
                                                 
7 European Union, “Treaty of the European Union of 7 February 1992”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C191E, 29 July 1992, article 105(5). 
8 D. Gros & N. Thygesen, European Monetary Integration from the European Monetary System 
to Economic and Monetary Union, Harlow, Adison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998, 2nd edn., p. 
403. 
9 M. Chang, Monetary Integration in the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009, p. 35. 
10 H. Macartney & M. Moran, “Banking and Financial Market Regulation and Supervision”, in K. 
Dyson (ed.), The Euro at 10, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 327. 
11 C. McCreevy, “The New Global Regulatory Agenda in Financial Services”, International 
Finance, vol. 9, no. 3, 2006, p. 386. 
12 The Four-Level Approach proposed a new system to speed up the regulatory process and 
supervisory convergence.  David Smith 
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relevant supervisory bodies who would be able to coordinate and promote a 
consistent interpretation of EU directives as well as attempt to converge supervisory 
practices. Nonetheless, in the light of the financial crisis this attempt seems to have 
failed. The Committees comprised an inordinate number of members, totalling over 
50 in the Committee of European Banking Services (CEBS)  alone.  13 The Memo-
randums of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2005 and 2008 on cooperation in 
situations of financial crisis were quickly ignored in the case of the failure of Dexia 
and Fortis. At this time,  crisis resolution was entirely the responsibility of national 
treasuries and thus carried out on an ad hoc basis, given the fact that the MoUs 
never alluded to an ex ante burden sharing arrangement.14 
The process of deregulation within the EU financial market started with free capital 
movements and was continued by the introduction of the European passport for 
banking and the FSAP. Simultaneously, the introduction of the ‘Lamfalussy Process’ 
sought to ensure greater flexibility in the regulatory process and enhanced 
cooperation between national regulators and supervisors. Despite some positive 
steps forward, the crisis has revealed a number of institutional flaws that were present 
in the EU and consequently in the Eurozone since its creation. In hindsight, it seems 
startling that a greater amount of attention of regulation and supervision was not 
given to the Eurozone level. The initiatives mentioned above were situated at the EU 
level, although there now appears to be greater systemic risk given that there is only 
one currency connecting the financial systems of Eurozone countries.  
European System of Financial Supervision 
Since the start of the crisis there have been, on a global level, policy initiatives to 
correct the “embarrassing blind spots in the pre-crisis understanding of the financial 
system”,15 notably the creation and adoption of authorities mandated to survey and 
contribute to the stability of the overall financial system. The EU and  its Member 
States have been no different in this regard. In 2009, the Commission proposed a set 
of institutional reforms after the findings of the de Larosière Report produced by the 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, which were subsequently 
                                                 
13 N. Véron, “Is Europe ready for a Banking Crisis?”, Bruegel, Brussels, 2007, p. 4, retrieved 03 
October 2011, http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/234-is-
europe-ready- for- a-major-banking-crisis/. 
14 J. Pisani-Ferry & A. Sapir, “Banking Crisis Management in the EU: an early assessment”, 
Economic Policy, vol. 25, no. 62, 2010, p. 346. 
15 Véron, “Financial Reform after the crisis”, op.cit., p. 11. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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adopted in November 2010 in several regulations.16 The new supervisory package 
sets out a two-pillar process that intertwines micro- and macro-prudential supervision. 
The overall structure is known as the European System of Financial Supervision and 
displayed in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: New European Supervisory Framework 
 
Source: based on D. Green, “International Financial Regulation”, in N. Bayne & S. Woolcock 
(eds.), The New Economic Diplomacy, Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, 3rd edn., p. 267. 
 
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
The acknowledgement and the attempt to create a European authority to survey 
systemic risk in the EU’s financial system represents an important step forward. The 
ESRB is primarily focused on macro-prudential risk, but it has been mandated to work 
closely with the  European Supervisory Authorities  (ESAs).  Consequently,  there is a 
‘cross composition’ of the ESRB, which is very beneficial on initial examination. By 
including the ECB, it makes use of its  already established advisory capacities to 
                                                 
16  Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 1092/2010”, “No 1093/2010”, “No 
1094/2010”, “No 1095/2010”, “No 1096/2010”, Official Journal of the European Union, L331, 24 
November 2010. David Smith 
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systemic risk and allows the presence of an institution of the Eurozone. The inclusion 
of the National Central Banks (NCBs) and the ESAs is also important, as the ESRB will 
rely on information only available to these authorities in order to make an assessment 
of the overall stability of the financial system. From this point of view, the EU-level 
body is well designed as it is very inclusive of all the important actors.  
However, the instruments given to the ESRB are rather limited, and in fact “it lacks 
instruments to address systemic risk”.17 “As response to potential systemic risks, the 
ESRB may issue warnings and recommendations on how to mitigate those risks.”18 
Recommendations  can  also be made to the European Commission regarding a 
certain piece of legislation, meaning that the ESRB can impact EU law in this domain. 
According to article 18 of Regulation No. 1092/2010, the ESRB can make its warnings 
and recommendations public. 19 Much  in the same way that NCBs  can release 
information into the public domain with the objective of influencing markets or 
financial institutions, the ESRB has the same possibility. Nevertheless, these tools are 
not legally binding on the addressees. Instead,  there is an “act and explain 
mechanism”, which the ESRB optimistically believes will make “it difficult for the 
addressees to simply ignore them  [the warnings and recommendations of the 
ESRB]”.20 The fact that it was agreed to make the warnings non-binding indicates 
that “De Larosière’s quasi-supranational vision of financial supervision” will remain just 
that, a vision, and the well-established soft law approach will continue to prevail.21  
Furthermore, the ESRB relies on the national authorities of each Member State  to 
implement its recommendations. One problem that  becomes apparent with this 
approach is that national authorities may well have very different views as to which 
macro-prudential instruments to use and how to use them. The UK, France, Belgium, 
and other jurisdictions have set about creating their own macro-prudential 
authorities;  in the UK the Financial Policy Committee, in France the Financial 
Regulation and Systemic Risk Council and in Belgium the Committee for Systemic 
Risks and System-relevant  Financial Institutions. The name attributed to each 
                                                 
17 Deutsche Bank Research, “Financial Supervision in the EU”, EU Monitor 84, 2011, p. 7. 
18 F. Dierick, P. Lennartsdotter & P. Del Favero, “The ESRB at work”, Macro-prudential 
Commentaries, European Systemic Risk Board, no. 1, 2012, p. 1. 
19 Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and 
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board”, Official Journal of the European Union, L331, 24 
November 2010, p. 10. 
20 Dierick, Lennartsdotter & Del Favero, op.cit., p. 4. 
21 D. Hodson, Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 34. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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institution is indicative of the diversity in conception and roles conceived for these 
authorities.22 As long as the ESRB does not have its own macro-prudential tool-kit and 
has to rely on the national authorities, it will face a tough challenge of coordination 
and harmonisation.  
Finally, the ESRB is also charged with  “[c]oordinating  its actions with those of 
international financial organisations, particularly the IMF and the FSB [Financial 
Stability Board] as well as relevant bodies in third countries on matters related to 
macro-prudential oversight”.23 
Therefore,  there is an explicit  external dimension given to the ESRB in its mission 
statement. Given that it is only a year old, it is difficult to judge at this stage the 
actual external presence that the ESRB will be able to maintain, taking into account 
that it is reliant on the ECB to ensure its secretariat. Nevertheless, in the context of the 
global financial architecture, this should  be seen in a positive light if the macro-
prudential authority coordinating European macro-prudential stability is interacting 
with those on the international scene.  
The European Supervisory Authorities 
The ESAs are made up of three separate bodies that take over the roles of the level 3 
Committees of the Four-Level Approach proposed by the ‘Lamfalussy Process’. These 
Committees are now called the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The first distinction is that the ESAs have a 
legal personality unlike the previous Committees. They are mandated to take a pan-
European approach and must ensure “that  a  single set of harmonised rules and 
consistent supervisory practices are applied by national authorities”.24 The aim of a 
‘single European rulebook’ represents a significant step towards  achieving a 
consistent set of harmonised standards across the EU in supervisory and regulatory 
practices. In order to achieve this goal, the ESAs are mandated with wider reaching 
powers than the previous Committees. Firstly, they can draft binding technical 
standards as defined by EU financial legislation. For example, the ESMA currently has 
powers in several pieces of legislation, such as the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID),  the  Transparency Directive, the  Market Abuse Directive, the 
                                                 
22 Véron, “Financial Reform after the crisis”, op.cit., p. 11. 
23 Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 1092/2010”, op.cit., p. 6. 
24 Deutsche Bank Research, op.cit., p. 9. David Smith 
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Settlement Finality Directive,  and the Alternative  Investment  Fund  Managers 
Directive. As the Commission has the sole right of initiative, the ESAs will prepare the 
substance of such technical standards,  but the Commission must adopt them. In 
areas where they cannot issue legally binding technical standards, they will 
nevertheless  set  guidelines,  the difference being  that a national authority must 
explain its reasons for non-compliance.25  
While the technically binding standards on all EU Member States are a significant 
step forward, with the exception of the ESMA and credit rating agencies, the ESAs do 
not have any direct supervisory power. 26 The supervision of financial institutions 
remains a purely national pursuit. There is no European level supervision, which is 
disappointing,  given that the negative effects of the crisis were compounded by 
differences between home and host country’s supervision. Admittedly, Article 21 of 
Regulation 1095/2010 confers upon, in this case, the ESMA, the power to participate 
in Colleges of Supervisors, which consult  on cross-border groups. However,  in 
paragraph 1 of this article its remit is defined as: “The Authority shall contribute to 
promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of the 
colleges of supervisors” [emphasis added].27 This does not give the impression of a 
powerful new body that will direct cross-border supervision.  
Yet again there is an exception to this ‘soft touch approach’, in that the ESMA can, 
according to Article 19,  settle disagreements between competent authorities in 
cross-border situations with a binding effect to uphold consistency with Union law. 
The ESAs also have the ability, in emergency cases when declared by the Council, to 
adopt a decision, which requires the competent national authority to take action.28 
This being said,  there is a caveat in the form of article 38.  This  safeguard clause 
prevents ESMA from adopting a decision that could impact on the fiscal 
responsibilities of Member States. It seems that this article is an attempt, on the part 
of Member States, to protect their national interests and to prevent the establishment 
of a fully-fledged European supervisory body.  
                                                 
25 “A Guide to Understanding ESMA”, European Securities and Markets Authority, 2011, p. 5, 
retrieved 14 March 2012, http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_009.pdf. 
26 Deutsche Bank Research, op.cit., p. 10. 
27 Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L331, 24 November 2010, p. 101. 
28 Ibid., p. 100. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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The jury, so to speak, is still out on the new supervisory framework in the EU.  The 
conceptual aspects of linking both micro-  and macro-prudential supervision are 
appealing, and there is certainly an effort to ensure greater coordination between 
supervisory bodies who have been given greater powers  with which to  achieve 
these aims. The establishment of the ‘single European rulebook’ is another move in 
the right direction. The ESRB and the ESAs have also been charged with an external 
dimension. However, the reliance on national authorities for the success of the ESFS is 
all too apparent. In the matter of improving European supervision to prevent further 
crises, the EU has taken an ‘incremental step’ forward rather than a ‘giant leap’. The 
irony of the situation is that the ESA regulations recognise the limits of the previous 
structures for European supervisory coordination,  but do not manage to address 
them with a truly pan-European supervisory body.29  
Burden Sharing 
“[S]ome  day in the future our successors will find that, however good, the 
improvements our generation makes in the structure, regulation and supervision of 
the financial system, will let them down.”30 Therefore, it is necessary to consider at this 
point  what crisis management and resolution frameworks are in place with a 
particular focus on the burden sharing aspect.  The Commission, on 6 June 2012, 
published a legislative proposal for bank recovery and resolution.31 The proposal, 
unambitiously but realistically, follows the same logic as the agreed new supervisory 
framework in the sense that it “proposes a minimum harmonised set of tools and 
powers” but “Member States would be able to introduce additional tools at national 
level […] to deal with crises”.32  
An innovative idea is the use of a resolution college that would be  able to 
“coordinate preparatory and resolution measures among national authorities to 
ensure optimal solutions at Union level”.33 The national resolution authority that is 
responsible for the parent financial institution would supervise the resolution college. 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 85. 
30 P. Tucker, “The Crisis Management Menu”, in R. Ayadi, F. Lierman & M. Balling (eds.), Crisis 
Management at Cross-roads, Vienna, SUERF, 2010, p. 13.  
31  European Commission, Proposal for establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2012) 280 final, Brussels, 6 June 2012.  
32 European Commission, Bank recovery and resolution proposal: Frequently Asked Questions, 
MEMO/12/416, retrieved 20 June 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=MEMO/12/416&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
33 European Commission, Proposal for framework for recovery of credit institutions, op.cit., p. 
15. David Smith 
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The idea would be that the group resolution authorities would have the power to 
decide on how to resolve the group situation, including group liquidity management, 
which “may be suboptimal and the survival of the group could be hampered by 
supervisory ring-fencing”, and ex ante planning for possible group resolution plans.34 
The EBA would play a central role as a member of each resolution college and 
“perform a binding mediation role”.35 However, the binding mediation role of the 
EBA would be subject to article 38 of its founding directive, the safeguard clause, 
meaning that it could not take a binding decision that would impose on the fiscal 
responsibilities of the Member States.36 In this respect, the power of the EBA within the 
resolution colleges is somewhat limited.  
One notable actor since the crisis is the ECB. It has de facto been involved in burden 
sharing. When interbank markets had dried up of liquidity, the ECB was quick to 
respond to this by supplying liquidity to the market. “Under the programme, 
Eurosystem interventions are carried out in the euro area […] to ensure depth and 
liquidity in dysfunctional market segments”.37 This intervention fed institutions head-
quartered both within and outside of the Eurozone through the liquidity their 
subsidiaries or branches obtained. As a result, the ECB performed the role of liquidity 
support to the European banking system. There are several implications that arise 
from what happened. First, the interventions were generally accepted to be a 
success,38 which implies that the institutional structure of this institution was apt for 
tackling cross-border problems. The relative success of an institution mandated at 
the Eurozone level raises very searching questions for the Eurozone itself on how to 
proceed in the future with regards to financial stability and crisis management. The 
crisis has shown that the Eurozone may well act as a shield against wild currency 
fluctuations. Conversely, systemic risk would seem to be much higher amongst 
Eurozone states than non-Eurozone states.  
Crisis management and resolution are still rooted in the national context albeit with 
greater coordination amongst national resolution authorities. The Commission openly 
                                                 
34 European Central Bank, “The New EU Framework for Financial Crisis Management and 
Resolution”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, p. 91. 
35 European Commission, Proposal for framework for recovery of credit institutions, op.cit., p. 7. 
36 Council of the European Union, “No 1093/2010 the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority)”, Official Journal 
of the European Union, L331, 24 November 2010, p. 38. 
37 D. Schoenmaker, “Banking Supervision and Resolution: the European Dimension”, DSF Policy 
Paper Series, no. 19, 2012, p. 3.  
38 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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acknowledges that a single European resolution fund is necessary but accepts that 
in the absence of a single European supervisor and with differing insolvency regimes 
it is at present ‘unworkable’.39 Academics and practitioners have made suggestions 
of a Eurozone resolution fund as the precursor to an EU-wide fund.40 While this may 
be a reasonable option both for the Eurozone’s future stability and in terms of the 
politically sensitive issue of a Europe-wide fund or authority, it does raise questions as 
to the future relationship between the Eurozone countries and the ‘outs’, and has 
implications for the internal financial market.  
Before the crisis, a burden-sharing mechanism for sovereign debt would have been 
unthinkable, yet it is now in place in the Eurozone. In the words of the Vice-President 
of the ECB: “Crises make us reconsider things that we would have seen as beyond 
the feasibility horizon.”41 The Eurozone has emerged as a stronger conceptual entity 
since the crisis. The internal financial market has been pursued clearly on a EU27-
level, and the reforms to supervision and regulation have also revolved around the 
EU as a whole with a marked absence of the Eurozone as an actor. The structure of 
regulation and supervision within the EU has been sub-optimal as shown by the 
recent events of the crisis. The reforms that have been proposed have not corrected 
all the inconsistencies that have existed since the liberalisation of capital 
movements. To sum up, there is still a dilemma between an integrated European 
financial market and the reluctance to relinquish national control of supervision and 
crisis resolution. This disparity affects the Eurozone in its ability to put forward a truly 
unified model towards initiatives such as the FSB’s resolution regimes.  
The internal institutional developments are inextricably linked to the external role of 
the Eurozone.  In the current system it is still difficult to see how the Eurozone can 
export its model as an example for international financial regulatory reform as long 
as these inconsistencies persist.  
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The City, the UK and EU Financial Regulation 
A Change of Mantra? 
The impact of the UK and the City on EU financial regulation, and by extension the 
Eurozone, is well known. The MiFID, for example, “required all countries to be like the 
UK, in permitting systemic internalizing”. 42 Yet the financial crisis has questioned 
whether the ‘soft touch’ approach so fervently pursued by UK authorities and others 
around the globe was, in fact, the correct one. The following section will examine the 
recent developments in the UK, allowing an insight into the impact on the Eurozone 
going forward. 
Major reviews of the financial regulatory system have taken place at both the EU 
level, the de Larosière Report (February 2009), and at the national level in the UK, the 
Turner Review (March 2009).43 It is not an understatement to say that both of these 
reviews have had a far-reaching impact on the regulatory and supervisory 
architecture within Europe and in the UK. Lord Turner, at the publication of his report, 
stated, “’soft-touch’ regulation has been consigned to the dust-bin of history”.44 It 
would appear that there has been an important change of mind-set that has taken 
place amongst British authorities. 
The de Larosière Report and the Turner Review show many similarities in their findings. 
They agree on the major causes of the financial crisis,45 both call for a review of the 
pro-cyclical effects that result from ‘BASEL II Accords’ and both urge “a fundamental 
review of CRAs [Credit Rating Agencies] economic model should be conducted”.46 
Apart from some differences in the forward-looking recommendations made by 
each report, it could be considered that a “technocratic cross-Channel consensus 
on the causes of the financial crisis and the lessons to be learned” has emerged from 
the two reports.47  
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A technocratic consensus may be admirable, but policy issues, which before the 
crisis were the restricted domain of technicians and practitioners, have received 
greater attention from elected officials. If the technocratic consensus is not reflected 
in the political rhetoric or decision-making due to elected officials responding to 
domestic audiences’ concerns, policy-making could be pushed in unfavourable 
directions. This, to a large extent, has been the case in the formation of the new EU 
financial regulatory and supervisory framework. The UK was able to impose certain 
restrictions on the progress of the new framework. The European Council welcomed 
the de Larosière Report in March 2009, although it quickly gave in to “opposition from 
the UK  […]  against giving the ECB a say over financial stability beyond the euro 
area”.48 Thus, the limits of the role of the ECB in financial stability have been shaped 
by an entity that is not actually part of the Eurozone. Furthermore, the “sine qua non 
of any British agreement” to a new financial framework was the explicit exclusion of 
any fiscal burden sharing for financial institutions that may be in trouble.49  
The political actions of the UK have left a deep imprint on the whole of the new 
European financial framework. The City is one of the biggest financial centres for 
euro-denominated international transactions and the UK is a key driver in financial 
policy, both of which are external to the Eurozone. There is a paradoxical point in 
that the UK has significant influence on the financial system of the Eurozone whilst at 
the same time it is strongly opposed to joining it.  
The UK: A Unilateral Approach 
The banking and sovereign debt crises have highlighted the need for solidarity and 
collective action within the EU. Despite the technocratic agreement on the causes 
of the crisis and the way forward, there is still a different political rhetoric being 
pursued by the UK and the EU when it comes to the new financial framework for 
after the crisis. The UK resisted increasing the supranational nature of financial 
regulation and supervision in the EU. This does not imply that the UK has stood by the 
use of ‘soft touch’ regulation. On the contrary, the UK could be considered to be “at 
the strict end of the EU spectrum”.50 In 2011 all political parties accepted the results 
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of a report delivered by an Independent Commission on Banking.51 While the results 
of the so-called Vickers Report testify to the move away from ‘soft touch’ regulation 
to a stricter approach to financial regulation, this is not necessarily the problem that 
the UK poses for the EU or the Eurozone. The unilateral action of the UK has provoked 
difficult questions as to the future of the single market and the relationship that the 
UK maintains with the EU and the Eurozone.  
There are two controversial suggestions, namely ring-fencing measures for UK banks 
and tough capital requirements on banks. The former would mean that banks “will 
be required to establish a separate legal entity within their corporate structure to 
provide retail and commercial banking services in the UK”.52 The idea behind this 
proposal is to allow retail services to be insulated from riskier banking activities. In 
terms of ensuring greater stability for the financial sector in the UK, this idea could 
yield  positive  results, although there would be secondary effects on the state of 
competition within the UK retail banking sector and therefore on the single market. 
Banks,  which operate primarily in other countries with different regulatory 
procedures, would be forced to adapt their structures if they wanted to enter the UK 
banking market. The ring-fencing idea,  if only applied in the UK,  could have 
dissuasive effects on new entrants to the UK retail banking market. The case could 
even be made that the UK is pursuing a form of financial protectionism.  
Véron persuasively argues that although the controversial proposal of ring-fencing 
may appear to contradict the principles of the single market for financial services, 
the institutions and effective centralised regulation are not currently in place for a 
single market. “As long as these do not exist […] the single banking market must 
remain a fiction.”53 He suggests  that the Vickers Report has, in fact,  provided a 
valuable public service to the EU by identifying this contradiction. Despite the fact 
that he may well be correct with these comments, should the ring-fencing proposal 
not  be  considered in another light? The UK, by accepting the suggestions of the 
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Vickers Report, is prolonging the fragmentation of the EU single market for financial 
services.  
The impact of the UK idea of ring-fencing would not only be a backwards step away 
from a single financial market, but would also put pressure on the EU approach. In 
January 2012, Commissioner Barnier announced that a High-level Expert Group 
would be established.54 It has the specific mandate to consider structural reforms in 
the EU banking sector, with particular attention given to the ring-fencing proposed 
by the Vickers Report and the Volcker Rule.55 Although their findings will not be 
published until late 2012, if they were to suggest an EU-wide ring-fencing, the impact 
on the universal banking model that dominates on the European continent will be 
significant.  There  would be a fundamental shift in the structure of banks in each 
country. Granted this is hypothetical, and the findings of the High-level Group may 
well be very different, the underlying point is clear:  The UK,  by acting first in 
accordance with its own interests, will have a significant impact on the whole of the 
EU’s banking sector. Furthermore, what is adopted in the EU will have ramifications 
on the international level,  as  international financial institutions will have to  make 
adjustments to meet the regulatory requirements in the EU if they wish to continue to 
operate in the large EU financial market.  
The second controversial suggestion made by the Vickers Report refers to greater 
capital requirements on UK  banks in order to improve loss-absorbency.  It puts 
forward that the ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets should be at least 10% for 
banks in the UK, which is higher than those proposed under ‘BASEL III’ (generally 8-
9.5%).56 The Commission has simultaneously put forward proposals in the form of the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) to implement ‘BASEL III’. However, these 
proposals contain “minimal flexibility for Member States to impose lower or higher 
capital requirements”.57  
By recommending higher capital ratios,  the UK  is effectively wishing  to introduce 
measures that would propagate different national regimes within the EU. One of the 
main criticisms to emerge from the crisis has been the range of different national 
regulatory and supervisory regimes that are present in the supposed  EU  single 
financial market. As Whyte notes, “far from narrowing, the Channel looks as wide as 
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ever”, despite the fact that the UK has abandoned its ‘soft touch’ approach.58 The 
unilateral posture of the UK in response to the financial crisis shows little change from 
its actions before the crisis, albeit now being at the other end of the spectrum.  
The UK is often referred to as the awkward partner in the EU. The examples analysed 
in this section have reinforced the image of a country wanting to pursue its national 
interest in the field of financial regulation while resisting the ‘control  of  Brussels’. 
However, “it is no longer clear that this Janus-faced position is tenable”.59 The UK has 
implicitly  acknowledged,  both  in the Turner Review and the Vickers Report,  the 
problems posed by the financial trilemma of having integrated financial markets and 
a stable financial system, whilst still maintaining national supervision.60 By advocating 
for  a possible ring-fencing  of the UK retail banking system and preventing a truly 
European supervision, it could  be suggested that  the UK has chosen a stable 
financial system and national supervision,  at the expense of integrated financial 
markets. This may be suitable for the UK but what of the Eurozone countries and its 
future members, who have opted for a higher level of economic integration with the 
introduction of a single currency? It is less likely that the survival and future stability of 
the  Eurozone can be achieved with the same choices. An integrated financial 
market is a crucial aspect of a currency union. Financial stability is also highly 
desirable for the success of a currency union, meaning that national supervision 
would seem to be the odd one out. There is a risk that the Eurozone’s choice will be 
made by default by the UK.  
As Schoenmaker rightly states, the UK is the informal leader in financial services and 
must be taken into account, just as France has an informal leadership in agriculture.61 
The problem lies in the fact that the UK seems to act only for its national interest. A 
sovereign state cannot be criticised for acting to protect its own national interest, as 
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this is each state’s right to do so. For example, Germany could be argued to be 
pursuing its own national interest in the way it shaped the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’. 
However, the UK can be reproached for not acting with greater coordination with its 
partners. The financial crisis has highlighted that financial markets, on a global scale, 
and those of the EU Member States, and to an even greater extent the Eurozone are, 
despite some fragmentation, inextricably linked. This has effectively placed limits on 
the sovereignty of a state to act without considering others, especially in the context 
of the EU. A choice will need to be made by the UK with regards to the role that it 
wishes to pursue in the EU.  
ECB Executive Board member Jörg Asmussen called, at the start of April 2012, for 
greater integration in financial policy at the Eurozone level.62 This would include 
establishing its own system to monitor financial institutions and a common fund for 
collapses,  if further integration is not possible at the EU27-level. While Commission 
officials have been hesitant about any action that could fragment the single market 
and create a messier institutional setup,63 “[u]ltimately, monetary union cannot be 
sustainable without fiscal union and banking union”.64 It is, of course, economically 
preferable to include the City and the UK in the future process of financial integration 
and elaborating financial regulation, but there is a real risk that this will not happen. 
Such an occurrence would pose fundamental questions on the dichotomy between 
the governance of the EU Member States and the Eurozone members.  
The continuing fragmentation of the EU in the area of financial services is a cause of 
concern. This is primarily because, without greater coordination and harmonisation 
of the different domestic markets, the EU could commit the same errors and suffer 
further financial crises that are exacerbated by the different national regimes. The 
role of the UK  as a driver of direction, external to the Eurozone,  is crucial. It can 
prevent the Eurozone from establishing the necessary financial regulation to ensure 
its future stability and prosperity. As long as financial regulation remains at the EU27-
level, the UK will always have a large impact on the Eurozone. 
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Academics and practitioners alike have alluded to putting a ‘European stamp’ on 
the reforms of the global regulatory architecture, but this is a misnomer.65 There is 
neither a European model nor a Eurozone model to speak of because it has been 
contorted by the UK and the City. Instead, it represents the limits of their willingness to 
move towards a closer supranational framework. As long as the UK is able to shape 
financial regulation, the EU or the Eurozone will struggle to put a ‘European stamp’ 
on the reform of international financial regulation that represents The Eurozone and 
the EU’s collective interest rather than simply those of the UK or the City.  
A Fragmented External Representation 
“The coordination of the global financial regulatory reform agenda during the crisis 
has been mostly the joint preserve of the IMF and FSB.”66 A brief glance at Table 1 
underlines the fact that the representation of the EU and the Eurozone in 
international fora is not uniform. This section will analyse the interaction between the 
Eurozone and the IMF in the sovereign debt crisis in order to understand whether 
fragmented representation poses a problem in reality.  
Table 1: EU External Representation in Practice 
  ECB  Eurogroup   EU 
Presidency 
Commissio
n 
ESAs or 
ESRB 
EU Member 
States 
OECD  Partial    Quasi-
member 
Quasi-
member 
  19 
IMF  
 
Observer    Delegated      27 
Financial Stability 
Board 
Member      Member    6 
BCBS 
 
Observer      Observer  Observer  9 
G7 Finance 
Ministers & Central 
Bank Governors 
Quasi-
member 
Quasi-
member 
  Partial    4 
G20 Finance 
Ministers & Central 
Bank Governors 
Member    Member  Attending    5 
G20 Heads of 
States or 
Government 
    Member  Member    6 
 
Source: based on G. Glöckler & Z. Truchlewski, “From polyphony to harmony? The external 
representation of EMU”, in J. Lieb, N. Ondarza & D. Schwarzer (eds.), The European Union in 
International Fora, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011, p. 119 (fifth column added by author). 
 
The IMF, which has since the onset of the crisis reaffirmed its role on the international 
scene, granted observer status to the ECB. The ECB is allowed to speak on issues 
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pertaining to monetary policy and exchange-rate policy, while the Executive Board 
member who is holding the Presidency would speak on issues of particular relevance 
to the EMU.67 This pragmatic solution allowed for the ECB, as the only central bank 
having observer status, to represent the monetary policy of the Eurozone, and did 
not necessitate a change to the Statutes of the IMF.  
In the case of the IMF, “the most frequent mode of coordination/concertation is the 
EU format rather than the Euro area one”.68 Only France, Germany and the UK have 
their own seat on the IMF Executive Board, while other Member States are split 
amongst mixed constituencies, in which the EU Member State does not always hold 
the Executive Board seat but must share it with non-EU countries. Two bodies exist to 
facilitate coordination: the Economic and Financial Committee’s Sub-Committee on 
the International Monetary Fund (SCIMF) and the group of EU representatives to the 
IMF (EURIMF). It is important to note, that coordination in these bodies is taking place 
at the EU level. There is no clear indication, except for monetary and exchange-rate 
policy, that the Eurozone makes significant efforts at the IMF to establish a common 
position on issues relating to financial regulation, supervision or fiscal policies. While 
this is understandable given that the competences are internally set along EU lines, it 
could hinder the realisation of a common Eurozone position on such issues.  
Before the financial crisis, it was unthinkable that any European no less Eurozone 
country, would have recourse to IMF funds. Yet this has been the case for three 
Eurozone states at the time of writing,69 Greece, Ireland and Portugal, whilst Cyprus 
has requested external financial aid. At the start of 2010, the gravity of the situation 
faced by Greece and the Eurozone became clear and statements from politicians 
pledging support were no longer enough to calm government bond interest rates.  
A statement issued by EU heads of state or government on 11 February 
2010 promised to draw on the ‘expertise’ of the IMF (Heads of state or 
government of the European Union 2010), but widening interest rate 
differentials between Greek and German government bonds 
suggested that markets remained unconvinced about the EU’s ability 
to do without the Fund’s financial resources.70 
After hostility towards the involvement of the IMF’s financial resources, fearing that 
this could be a show of weakness of Europe to manage the Eurozone, Member 
                                                 
67 Agreed at the Vienna European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Vienna, 11-12 December 
1998. 
68 Glöckler & Truchlewski, op.cit., p. 120. 
69 This paper was submitted for publication in August 2012.  
70 Hodson, op.cit., p. 105. David Smith 
24 
 
States agreed at the March 2010 European Council to involve the IMF in any rescue 
plan.71 It was not, however, until 2 May 2010 that an eventual package for Greece 
was agreed upon. The Greek loans were given three months after the EU govern-
ments initially tried to rectify the situation without the resources of the IMF.  
The month of May also saw the announcement of an EU-IMF initiative to provide 
support to Eurozone states in difficulty.72 Ireland was the first Eurozone member to 
make use of this facility in November 2010, followed by Portugal in May 2011. Ireland, 
at the time, also received bilateral loans from the UK, Denmark and Sweden, which 
were separate from the European  Financial  Stability  Fund (EFSF)  created by the 
Eurozone members. The other financial instrument that was created simultaneously 
was the European financial stabilisation mechanism (EFSM). 
Several points need to be highlighted regarding the involvement of the IMF. A 
noticeable problem during the sovereign debt crisis was the initial time delays 
between the EU acknowledging the need to make use of the ‘Fund’s expertise’ and 
the eventual agreement of aid for Greece. For the Greek deal there was a delay of 
around three months. “The EU’s prevarication over the Greek fiscal crisis nonetheless 
weakened the former’s bargaining position in relation to the Fund.”73 The other two 
rescue packages were agreed in a shorter time period of around one month. There 
have been various arguments put forward by academics as regards the reasoning 
behind such delays. One argument blames the poor coordination methods without 
having a single voice externally or at the IMF for the Eurozone. The other line of 
argumentation denounces deep-seated divergences between Member States as 
the source of the EU’s procrastination, stating that a single chair at the IMF would 
have done little to overcome these differences.74 
A combination of these two arguments is more credible rather than viewing each 
one as mutually exclusive. The deep-seated divergences in the policy response 
required were in part a cause of the EU’s prevarication. It is undoubtedly hard for 
Eurozone and EU governments to overcome differences of opinion that would have 
a lasting effect on the EU. At the same time, improving coordination methods would 
have helped in finding a common position and expressing it externally.  
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The problem lies in the fact that “the markets and Europe’s global partners 
increasingly perceived the Euro area as an entity in itself and consequently 
expected governments to assume responsibility for the stability and smooth 
functioning of the Euro area”. 75  This  perception does not accommodate 
heterogeneous preferences. The Eurozone needs, therefore, to ensure that it can 
better overcome its differences, otherwise it will continually be weakened in 
negotiations, as was the case with the IMF. If important financial actors, markets, and 
other international partners now consider the Eurozone a single entity, then logically 
it would be beneficial to reflect this in the policy responses and the actions of the 
Eurozone towards these actors.  
However, the Eurozone was able to determine some of the modalities of the Greek 
rescue package. Reports at the time suggested that the IMF approached the 
subject of debt restructuring, which was emphatically rejected by European 
policymakers.76 The Commission and the ECB also managed to obtain a key role in 
the monitoring process as part of the so-called Troika (together with the IMF). Then, in 
March 2011, European policymakers began a discordant debate as to whether a 
partial or full debt restructuring was necessary for Greece.77 The end result was, in 
fact, a partial debt restructuring that took place in March 2012. Two interesting points 
emerge from these events. Firstly, they illustrate the point that the Eurozone, by 
resisting the IMF’s suggestions about debt restructuring initially, did have some 
influence on the IMF. The Eurozone, despite its fragmented structure that is plagued 
by heterogeneous preferences, was thus able to prevent the IMF from getting its way 
initially. Conversely, the fact that there was a need for a debt restructuring two years 
after the IMF had raised the idea highlights the mistaken policy decisions taken in the 
Eurozone. This example serves to illustrate the issue of the Eurozone’s credibility and its 
failings.  Not only has it proven that the Eurozone has made misguided policy 
decisions, but also that its speed of policymaking has been slow. “[T]he crisis showed 
that events can unfold in the blink of an eye, putting strong pressure on actors and 
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their capacity to take decisions and implement them.” 78 The capacity of the 
Eurozone to take decisions, based on the evidence, has to be questioned. 
The final remark about the intervention of the IMF in the Eurozone concerns the role 
that the Commission obtained. The IMF usually seeks an agreement with the relevant 
monetary and fiscal authorities, but in this case that includes the Commission and 
some Member States. The Commission has also been asked by the Eurozone states to 
report on the implementation of adjustment measures and the aid packages. The ad 
hoc  cooperation between the Commission and the IMF was given a more 
permanent basis following the announcement of the joint EU-IMF initiative in May 
2010. Thus, “it is supposed to operate jointly with the IMF, so interaction within the 
Euro area may become an ongoing feature”.79 As a result, the Commission has 
become a key actor in the Troika and the sovereign debt crisis, although it maintains 
a rather anomalous position vis-à-vis the IMF.  
The Commission is not a member of the IMF, it does not have observer status, yet it is 
working very closely with the Fund to ensure the successful resolution of the sovereign 
debt crisis. This is problematic, as one of the European institutions that is working the 
closest at the moment with the IMF is non-existent at the Executive Board, the main 
decision-making body of the Fund. Even the ECB, which has observer status, is not 
privy to the decision-making processes of the Executive Body. In view of the 
disjointed position of the Commission with regards to the IMF, it is hard to see how a 
clear position can be communicated, given the number of different European 
voices to which the IMF is subjected. The anomalous position of the Commission 
reinforces the need to reform the external representation in order to address the 
problems outlined in this section. 
In conclusion, the Eurozone’s external representation is plagued by fragmentation 
and disjointed access in international bodies. In practice this has proven somewhat 
problematic. Admittedly there are examples of Eurozone influence in initial 
negotiations with the IMF, and the cooperation between EU institutions and the IMF 
has turned the Eurozone into its partner. It remains to be seen what effect this will 
have on the relationship and the influence that the Eurozone can exercise in the 
future. However, the Eurozone’s, and the EU’s, external representation is still marred 
by complexity and numerous different actors. The Eurozone is increasingly being 
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treated and viewed as a single entity by international markets and partners, but this 
has yet to be reflected in its external representation.  
“The crisis has accelerated the transition from a western-dominated financial world 
toward a more globally-balanced one.”80 The pressure is likely to keep increasing on 
the EU and the Eurozone to rectify the myriad of its external representation in order to 
better reflect the reality of global economics. “A cacophony from the European side 
in discussions would condemn the EU to a spectator role.”81 The analysis presented in 
this  section  indicates that despite the Eurozone becoming an informal partner of 
institutions like the IMF, the formal representation in the Fund and in general is still 
fragmented. The way in which the Eurozone acts, as a collection of actors, and the 
way it is treated, increasingly as a single entity, are inconsistent and restrict its ability 
to interact effectively in international fora, thus limiting its external role. 
 
Conclusion 
“EU members need to come out with a clear view of what kind 
of coordination device they want to invent. There are several 
routes forward, but failing to select one could contribute to 
marginalizing the Eurozone in the global economy”.82 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the capacity of the Eurozone to play a role 
in the reform of international financial regulation. Throughout this paper the analysis 
has largely shown the Eurozone to be an institutionally constrained actor.  
The single market for financial services and financial regulation has been pursued at 
the EU27-level. The UK has had a dominant influence on the direction of financial 
regulation before the crisis, and it would appear that this is still the case in response 
to the crisis. The examination of the new ESFS has illustrated that the problem of 
differing national regimes has not been overcome. The ESFS propagates this situation 
by avoiding a powerful European supervisory or crisis management system. Due to 
the institutional setup that is present in the EU financial system  as a whole, the 
Eurozone  struggles to  be an important actor  despite the fact that the  Member 
States’  national systems are heavily interdependent. The disparity between the 
Eurozone and the EU on an internal level is an impediment for the development of a 
                                                 
80 Véron, “Financial Reform after the crisis”, op.cit., p. 9. 
81 Glöckler, op.cit., p. 61. 
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‘Eurozone approach’. As there is no approach to export, the impact on international 
reform is thus likely to be relatively low.  
The above-mentioned internal problems are reflected in the external representation 
of the Eurozone. In the IMF, one of the institutions that has been largely responsible 
for global regulatory reform, the division of constituencies initially makes coordination 
amongst Member States difficult. In addition, coordination attempts among Member 
States seems to be solely focused at the EU27-level with the absence of the 
Eurozone. The actions of the Eurozone states, during the sovereign debt crisis, have 
also revealed  the weakness of the Eurozone to act collectively in an external 
environment, and long delays in taking action were witnessed. The evidence tends 
to confirm the hypothesis stated in the introduction, which took a pessimistic stance 
on the role of the Eurozone in the reform of international financial regulation. 
However, it should be considered that recent developments suggest a potentially 
greater role for the Eurozone as an entity in the future. The sovereign debt crisis 
dictated that the Eurozone became a partner of the IMF, while the ECB has 
obtained a central role in the newly created macro-prudential supervisory authority, 
the ESRB. The Eurozone has emerged from the crisis as a stronger conceptual entity 
with calls to pursue further financial policy integration at this level. Therefore, there is 
evidence suggesting a more optimistic evaluation of the Eurozone’s role in the 
reform of international financial regulation  in the future;  emphasis placed on the 
word ‘future’, as this is not a certain notion.  
This more optimistic viewpoint of the Eurozone’s role raises more searching questions 
with regards to  its future relationship within the EU,  with those states that are not 
currently in the Eurozone and those opposed to joining it. The notion of a Eurozone 
resolution fund, or pushing for greater financial regulation integration at the Eurozone 
level, if not possible at the EU-level, have been alluded to in this work. This could 
reinforce the dichotomy between the Eurozone Member States and the non-
Eurozone states, especially in terms of governance structures. Additionally, this will 
have  implications towards the single market for financial services.  An even wider 
governance gap could be created, leaving place to a ‘variable geometry’ or ‘multi-
speed Europe’ that is difficult to reconcile with a single market for financial services.  
Considering  the possibility of greater financial policy integration  in the context  of 
external representation of the Eurozone,  the argument  for a reformed and more 
unified external representation would become even more compelling. The question EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2012 
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would then be:  In what format should a more unified external representation be 
pursued? Should it be through stronger coordination methods or with the creation of 
a single external representative for the Eurozone? In the case of the IMF, would this 
mean a single Eurozone seat on the Executive Board? From an external point of view, 
a  single Eurozone seat would dramatically  change the structure and the voting 
power of constituencies on the Executive Board. From the internal point of view, the 
occupier of such a chair would be very controversial. From which institution would 
the occupier of the single seat be selected? Should it be the ECB, the Commission, or 
even from one of the Eurozone Member States? Even if there was an agreement on 
how to choose the new holder of the single chair, it is hard to believe that the holder 
would have the same ability to take important binding decisions, as would a national 
Executive Board member. The formation of common positions then becomes even 
more important. The fact of having a single currency does not imply that Eurozone 
countries all share the same view on the Fund’s projects in Africa, for example.83 
This hypothetical line of reasoning usefully serves to illustrate the point that the current 
reform processes in the financial regulation in the EU are of critical importance. The 
halfway-house  nature of the regulatory and supervisory reforms sparked calls for 
further Eurozone integration, which in turn would have wide-reaching ramifications 
on the EU and, further afield, in the international system. The effect of such changes 
cannot be underestimated, as they would touch upon the very essence of the EU 
and the Eurozone.  
This paper opened with a quote describing the fall of great empires due to internal 
tensions. It has been shown that internal tensions in the EU are at the very heart of the 
Eurozone’s  difficulties  in playing a role in the reform of international financial 
regulation. Surmounting these tensions is not only a pre-requisite for the Eurozone to 
overcome its structural disadvantage in international financial politics, but it is also 
vital in guaranteeing its future stability. 
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Annex 
New Four-Level Approach Proposed by the ‘Lamfalussy Process’ 
 
Source: European Commission, The Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets, Final Report, Brussels, 15 February 2001, p. 6. 
 
The ‘Lamfalussy Process’, as it became known, refers to the Committee of Wise Men 
presided over by Alexandre Lamfalussy charged with examining the state of the EU 
financial market. The final report was delivered on 15  February 2001 and was David Smith 
34 
 
“convinced that regulatory reform is required if the European Union’s objectives are 
to be  fulfilled”, specifically relating to the European Securities Market. 84  It 
recommended, therefore, a new four level approach “to speed up the regulatory 
process and to foster supervisory convergence in the EU”.85 The report advocated 
that “only framework directives need to be approved by Parliament and Council 
before technical details are ‘filled-in’ by a Committee composed of national 
regulators”. 86 Thus,  the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was 
created. The Committee’s role was to: 
-  Improve coordination amongst national securities regulators and develop an 
effective operational mechanisms to enhance day-to-day supervision 
-  Act as an advisory group to assist the Commission 
-  Try to ensure more consistent and quicker implementation of Community 
legislation in Member States 
The report also  recommended that,  if successful,  this new structure should be 
extended to banking and insurances services. This duly happened in March 2005, 
when a directive was adopted to create the Committee of European Banking 
Services (CEBS) and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).  
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